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This article tries to identify the crucial dimensions of strategic management in universities.  To do 
so, the author looks at some practical cases of successful strategic decisionmaking in European 
universities. 
This case study approach is motivated by the conviction that in universities strategic 
management should be done with a permanent eye on their specific organisational environment 
rather than by an analysis of the applicability of yet another prescriptive model from yet another 
management school. 
As a result, special attention goes to the astonishing power of networking: more and 
more a modern university appears as a set of overlapping networks kept together by a broadly 
shared mission.  Also important is the delicate task to strengthen the steering core without losing 
the innovative and mobilising benefits of decentralised decision making.  Looking at the strategic 
management models in the literature, undoubtedly the learning school offers the best guidelines 
for a successful steering of academic institutions. 
 
* * * 
 
Dit  artikel  beoogt  de  meest  cruciale  factoren  voor  een  succesvol  strategisch  management  in 
universiteiten naar voor te brengen. 
Hiertoe  worden  enkele  geslaagde  voorbeelden  van  strategische  beslissingen  in 
Europese  universiteiten  besproken.    Deze  case  study  benadering  wordt  verkozen  boven  een 
onderzoek naar de toepasbaarheid van de diverse bestaande managementmodellen omdat het voor 
de academische wereld meer dan voor de industrie, belangrijk is de specifieke organisationele 
omgeving in de analyse te laten doorwegen. 
Verrassend is de enorme kracht van netwerking naar voor: hoe langer, hoe meer komt 
een moderne universiteit naar voor als een verzameling van elkaar overlappende netwerken bij 
elkaar gehouden door een gemeenschappelijk gedragen visie.  Belangrijk is eveneens de delicate 
opdracht de centrale “steering core”, te versterken zonder de innoverings- en mobiliseringskracht 
te verliezen die besloten ligt in een ver doorgedreven decentralisatie van de beslissingsmacht.  
Wat  de  gangbare  strategische  managementmodellen  betreft,  is  het  ongetwijfeld  de  zg 
“learningschool” die het best inspeelt op de complexiteit van moderne universiteiten. 
Karel Tavernier 
Professor Emeritus, KULeuven Centrum voor 
Economische Studiën, Leuven. .   
I.  A CHANGED UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT 
 
This  paper  does  not  intend  to  make  an  extensive  analysis  of  strategic 
management  models  which  might  be  useful  for  higher  education  (Sporn 
(1999)).  Instead it will start from a concrete and successful case of decision 
making in a particular university.  This is done in the conviction that in search 
for  management  relevance,  much  more  can  be  learned  from  case  studies, 
benchmarking and interuniversity comparison (Clark (1998)), than from yet 
another prescriptive model from yet another management guru conceived for 
another environment (Verdin (1998)).  Of course this does not mean that such 
models could not contribute in providing a framework for orderly thinking, 
but,  in  developing  a  strategy  for  universities  or  polytechnics,  it  seems 
rewarding  to  keep  a  permanent  eye  on  the  specific  organisational 
characteristics  of  that  sector  and  to  move  from  practical  observations  to 
generalising  formalisation,  instead  of  the  other  way  around.    Looking  at 
today’s environment, universities must realise that the old days are gone and 
never will come back
1.  They now live in a completely different world with 
different requirements.   
A  first  predominant  observation  is  that,  almost  everywhere  in  the 
world, governments are increasingly unable to take up the full bill for Higher 
Education:  in  relation  to  other  priorities,  modern  universities  have  indeed 
become too expensive to be funded only with public money (The Economist 
(2005)).  Moreover, governments are not only unable but also unwilling to do 
so for the simple reason that in the knowledge society of today, a broad range 
of university products carry considerable benefits for those who have acquired 
them.    Who  profits  from  it,  should  pay  at  least  part  of  the  cost.    As  a 
consequence, universities have become “hybrid” institutions: semi-public and 
semi-private.  At least for part of their activities they are forced to operate in a 
globalising market with powerful new competitors sometimes coming from 
the  most  unexpected  corners:  multinationals  turning  their  internal  training 
centres into “accreditated” corporate universities, are good examples of this 
trend.  The same is true for the virtual open universities and the thriving “for 
profit educational institutions”. 
In the second place, universities face the challenge of a real science 
explosion.  Today, knowledge is simply too vast to master.  For their teaching 
approach  it  means  a  compelling  switch  from  ex  cathedra  teaching  to 
individual learning and, from knowledge accumulation to acquiring skills in 
handling  information.    More  important,  it  also  means  that  any  single 
university, be it Harvard or Oxford, is too small to do everything on its own.  
They either have to be selective in what to do and what not, or to go into 
mergers and networking.  The merger movement is especially clear in the 
non-university  sector  with  its  much  smaller  polytechnic  colleges.    The 
networking solution is more common in universities. 
Third,  because  knowledge  has  become  so  important  for  society, 
governments, business and individuals, all these “stakeholders” keep a critical 
eye on what universities do and how they do it.  They require accountability  
not only about the use of their resources, but also and even more about the 
quality  of  their  products  and  the  societal  relevance  of  their  activities.    In 
public  goal  setting  for  universities,  more  and  more  valorisation  of  their 
research findings is gaining importance.  Recently also corporate governance 
has made its entry, stressing transparency and bringing universities closer to 
the ways of business. 
 
 
II.  THE IMEC CASE (Imec (2004)) 
 
The first case that is put forward in this paper is a story from KULeuven.  
This institution is an old (1425) internationally oriented research university in 
Belgium.  It has a student enrolment of 29000 and a staff of about 6500 Full-
time-Equivalents (FTE) with another 6000 in its hospitals.  It has a medical 
faculty and an engineering school.  In the European Publication and Citation 
Index, it ranks among the best performers in Europe.  Via “Leuven Research 
and  Development”  (LRD)  its  excellent  industry-university  interface  that 
started  already  in  1972,  a  bias  towards  industrial  valorisation  is  strongly 
present.  In recent years more than 50 spin offs have been established aided by 
an innovation-incubator centre, a venture capital firm and a science park for 
new industrial intiatives (Declercq (2002)) 
The story starts in the  mid-eighties.  K.U.Leuven had  a relatively 
advanced  micro-electronic  department.    It  was  highly  valued  in  scientific 
circles and it was popular with the Belgian high-tech industry.  However, for 
the department head, it had become clear that the resources at his disposal 
were,  by  far,  insufficient  to  allow  his  120  top  researchers  to  work  on  an 
international level.  In an expensive field of study, it was feared that very soon 
he would be forced to abandon the scientific rat race, somehow one could not 
come up with investment money for a new laboratory of about 60 million 
Euro and a yearly budget of 30 million.  The university was simply not able to 
come even close to those high figures; they indeed amounted to 1/6 of the 
overall  university  subsidy.    The  threat  of  losing  an  important  centre  of 
excellence,  however,  led  to  a  strategic  brainstorming.    It  resulted  in  the 
following plan which afterwards proved to be a brilliant initiative. 
Among  the  Flemish  universities,  only  K.U.Leuven  had  chosen  to 
develop its micro-electronics to an international top level.  With this idea in 
mind, the other universities of Genth, Antwerp and Brussels were approached 
and invited to join forces in a new interuniversity micro-electronic laboratory 
(IMEC). 
It  was  argued  that  this  would  allow  them  to  upgrade  their  own 
theoretical and practical know-how in micro-electronics to a top level in one 
single  jump.    A  further  attractive  feature  of  the  proposal  was  that  each 
participating university would link up with their neighbouring polytechnical 
colleges, which in turn, could do the same with the local industry of their 
region.  The whole construction would then constitute an extensive network 
extremely  beneficial  not  only  for  scientific  research  but  also  for  its  
valorisation in industrial ventures.  The only, but important conditions from 
K.U.Leuven  were  that  the  central  laboratory  with  its  sophisticated  clean 
rooms and infrastructure should be located on its engineering campus and that 
the director general would be from K.U.Leuven. 
With  this  strategic  concept,  the  university  went  to  the  regional 
government  which  at  that  time  intended  to  launch  the  so  called  “third 
industrial revolution for economic revival”.  The negotiations resulted in a 
deal that the government would take up 60 pct. of the yearly budget.  The 
remaining 40 pct. ought to come from contract research, royalties, spin-offs 
and training activities.  In the meantime also industry had joined up. 
For K.U.Leuven such a move meant giving up a major comparative 
advantage and even the ownership of one of its most successful laboratories.  
However this was more than compensated for by a new funding source and by 
an enormous extension of its action radius.  Moreover, it was decided to keep 
the old laboratory, be it on a reduced scale and with a completely different 
focus than that of the new IMEC.  Indeed it did not seem  wise to put all 
micro-electronic eggs in the same basket. 
In 1984 IMEC started with a budget of 34 million Euro.  In 2004 it 
has grown to 145 million euros.  It now employs 1300 people coming from 50 
different countries.  It has created 20 industrial spin offs.  The government 
subsidy  has  fallen  from  60  pct.  to  23  pct.    An  intensive  multidisciplinary 
collaboration with other laboratories of the engineering faculty has been very 
rewarding for K.U.Leuven even beyond the field of micro-electronics.  The 
same is even truer for the other participating universities (IMEC (2004)) 
  At  present,  IMEC’s  central  mission  is  scientific  research  that 
precedes industrial needs by 3 to 10 years.  Its fields are: micro-electronics, 
nanotechnology,  design  methods  and  technologies  for  ICT  systems.    This 
mission is specified by a special attention for equilibrium between basic and 
applied  research  embracing  the  full  trajectory  from  chip  design,  chip 
production to packaging and micro-systems.  IMEC has developed a unique 
business model allowing industrial partners to participate in different research 
teams.    A  micro-electronic  training  center  provides  specialised  up-to-date 
courses and on the spot coaching.  Creating spinoffs is equally an explicit 
objective as well as the permanent upgrading of micro-electronic knowledge 
and operational knowhow in universities, politechnics and industries.   
This practical example teaches us several lessons about strategic management 
for universities: 
 
·  The astonishing power of networking. 
·  The  importance  of  a  widely  shared  mission  statement,  firmly 
imbedded in the attitudes and culture of the university. 
·  The importance for a university to delegate initiative and a large part 
of decision making to the lower levels in the hierarchy. 
·  The need to combine this delegation with a stronger steering core, be 
it of a certain type.  
·  The  importance  of  choosing  the  most  appropriate  model  or 




III.  LESSONS FOR STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 
 
 
A.  The importance of an explicit mission (K.U.Leuven) 
 
Most universities in Western Europe now have an explicit mission statement.  
However,  not  many  have  succeeded  in  going  beyond  a  public  relation 
document mainly intended for marketing purposes.  In order to be useful, a 
mission statement should have a widely shared and clear view on what the 
university aims at and how it will pursue it. 
In  its  mission,  K.U.Leuven  propagates  that  it  wants  to  be  an 
international  research  university  where,  in  the  tasks  of  academic  staff, 
fundamental research and scholarly publications prevail.  At the same time, 
however this predominant objective should go hand in hand with an active 
search for market relevant opportunities originating from the same research.  
This application-oriented attitude intends to contribute to the economic and 
cultural  benefit  of  the  Flemish  region.    Also  that  focus  is  explicit  in  the 
mission statement.  The IMEC initiative fitted this mission perfectly well.  It 
provided a safe guidance for decision makers.  They knew what course of 
action they could follow.  They were pretty sure, that afterwards, they would 
not be called back by an accidental majority in one or other council or by one 
or  other  lobbying  group  of  deans  and  professors  which  accidentally  were 
thinking that it was not such a good idea after all. 
The mission statement of an university is somehow its “constitution”.  
As  such  it  also  is  an  important  precondition  for  decentralised  decision 
making.  If everyone really understands the mission, then the leadership can 
work by broad objectives instead of rigid top down command: “that is the way 
to  go,  how  you  as  an  individual  should  do  it,  is  pretty  much  your  own 
business; there will be control not ex ante, but ex post, and together, in a 




B. Delegation, an important principle for universities 
 
In  the  second  place,  the  IMEC-story  illustrates  the  crucial  importance  of 
delegating  initiative  and  a  large  part  of  the  decision  making  power  to  the 
lower  levels  in  the  university  hierarchy,  in  this  case  a  department  in  the 
engineering faculty.  Indeed, according to organisational theory, universities 
have to be classified as “professional organisations”.  In such organisations, 
the expertise is not to be found at the rectorate or in a far a way government  
agency, but with the scientists in their labs and teaching halls.  If the expertise 
is there, so should be a large part of the decision making power (Mintzberg 
(1991)). 
By  doing  so,  the  innovative  capacity  of  the  institution  can  be 
broadened enormously and actively mobilised. 
 
 
C.  A stronger steering core? 
 
In the third place, a plea should be made in favour of a somewhat stronger 
steering core than is common in a university environment.  Here however one 
faces an important and often painful dichotomy.  On the one hand modern 
technology and increasing economics of scale require setting priorities and 
resisting  the  traditional  pressure  within  higher  education  in  favour  of  an 
egalitarian resource allocation.  At the other hand there is the need to preserve 
the mobilising power of the freedom to explore ever-new lanes of scientific 
research and fresh paradigms as well for individuals, as for their work units. 
 
 
D.  The power of networking and strategic alliances 
 
The  IMEC  example  shows,  that  by  setting  up  a  network  with  other 
universities,  polytechnics  and  industrial  firms,  the  boundaries  of  what  is 
possible can be shifted in a dramatic way.  Suddenly it becomes possible to 
work  in  a  different  world  with  new  partners  unthinkable  before  and  with 
research contracts of a completely different size.  Hence, one should realise 
that in these modern times, any single university is too small to do everything 
alone.  It requires either selectively cutting down certain activities or rely on 
networking. 
Looking at higher education in Western Europe today, this networking is 
most probably the dominant new feature in the organisation of universities 
and their way of working.  To understand more fully its possible implications, 
in what follows two additional examples are commented upon. 
 
·  LERU, the League of European Intensive Research Universities 
 
In the last decades, most European Universities have become acquainted 
with interuniversity networking.  Not in the least, this is due to the “EU 
Framework Programmes”.  Most of the time, this European funding mode 
requires a transnational participation of other universities very often also 
with  an  active  involvement  of  industrial  partners.    Undoubtedly  these 
framework  programmes  have  been  important  attributes  for 
internationalisation  and  “average”  quality  improvement  of  European 
Research and Education.  However, in comparison with the USA, they 
have apparently been much less performing in truely top basic research 
and its wealth bringing innovations.  Their set up is very much top down  
and  does  not  always  escape  the  criticism  of  a  short  run  outlook  and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies. 
In that perspective, in 2002, 12 universities
2 have decided to establish 
a  new  strategic  alliance  under  the  name  of  LERU,  the  League  of 
European Research Intensive Universities with its secretariat in Leuven.  
Their aim is to shift the European funding effort away from short run 
applications to long run basic research.  It is argued that this fundamental 
research  will  find  its  best  nurturing  grounds  when  it  is  heavily 
concentrated  in  centres  of  excellence  within  a  limited  number  of  top 
comprehensive research universities, working at the boundaries of human 
knowledge, in  an international  competitive  environment,  with research 
and  teaching  firmly  intertwined  and  where  excellence  is  the  only 
criterium for reward and for obtaining additional resources.  Any increase 
in European research fundings should prioritise basic research.  It is also 
important to state that successful centres of excellence are not created by 
one or other decree, but ought to be the result of greater European-wide 
competition (Veugelen (2004)) among bottom up projects. 
  Undoubtedly,  this  view  matches  the  new  trend,  which  articulates 
itself  worldwide,  most  certainly  with  the  Anglosaxon  countries  in  the 
lead.  In a globalising world this evolution seems unavoidable and will 
grow  stronger  over  the  years.    The  creation  in  1995  of  Flanders 
Interuniversity Institute for Biotechnology (V.I.B.) supports this thesis.  
V.I.B. is a virtual organisation that has taken over from the collaborating 
universities  large  parts  of  their  most  prestigious  groups  for  gene 
technological research and their scientific infrastructure.  It is virtual as 
its 800 researchers remain on their respective university location whereas 
the general strategy, their patent policy, property rights, spin offs, project 
organisation  and  their  industry  collaborations,  all  are  cared  for  in 
common headquarters.  Here again a considerable funding of government 
has been a major incentive. Looking for implications, a most probable 
outcome of autonomously working institutions might indeed very well be 
sharper hierarchy of universities (O’Leary( 1996)).  As in the USA, also 
on the European continent a new “Ivy league” seems to be in the making 
(Geuna (1998)).  It has at the top a few excellent institutions, which are 
growing stronger every year, and at the bottom an increasing number of 
schools, which are pushed back into a role of post secundary education 
and “me too research” with little societal value.  Apparently what is going 
on  is  a  self-enforcing  and  cumulative  process  by  which  talent  and 
resources from all over the world, concentrate in the same institutions.  
Having proven their quality, they become even more attractive for new 
resources,  minds  and  sponsors.    Their  competence  base  and  their 
scientific climate keep on growing.  Hence their comparative advantage 
continues to increase.  To this mechanism should be added the enormous 
advantage of belonging to a global network of top schools seeking out 
each other. This brings refreshing exchanges of new findings, renewing 
paradigms  and  intensive  collaboration  among  talented  academics.    In  
writing out its mission, each university should be realistic enough to take 
this  new  reality  into  account.    With  a  strong  research  based  ethos 
throughout  Higher  Education  much  resistance  can  be  expected  (Leru 
(2005)).    However,  international  figures  of  economic  growth  and 
unemployment suggest that  Europe does not have  much choice.  This 
should  however  not  be  the  misunderstood:  the  future  of  Europe’s 
competitive position in the world, does not only rely on the presence of 
performing research universities.  Equally important is the existence of a 
rich diversity of higher education ranging from the very research top, to 
teaching universities, professional polytechnics, and institutes for further 
education.  To flourish in a global world, the educational system should 
be such as to mobilise all possible talent whatever its content.  Essential 
hereby is the inbuilt possibility for any individual to grow through the 
different systems in individual learning trajectory.  This brings us to the 
second example at K.U.Leuven where such a solution is being tried. 
 
·   New associations in Flemish Higher Education 
 
For many years, in Flanders the coexistence of university programmes, 
two-cycle-polytechnic  education  (masters)  and  one-cycle-professional 
bachelor studies, had led to an unworkable confusion.  In order to clarify 
the situation, the government  launched the concept of associations of 
polytechnics  each  time  under  the  guidance  of  one  single  mother 
university.   
Next to the two cycle schools also the one cycle ones are expected to 
be  integrated  in  the  new  associations.    They  however  keep  their 
vocational  and  professional  character  and  are  not  subjected  to  the 
academisation (Tavernier (2004)). 
At  first,  in  Flanders  the  chosen  vehicle  was  planned  to  be  the 
“regional association”.  A regional association intends to bring together 
all “polytechnic schools” of the region in a collaborative network under 
the supervision each time of a local university. 
Respecting,  at  least  for  the  moment,  the  institutional  autonomy 
defended by universities and polytechnics alike, joining ought to occur on 
a voluntary basis.  However, to get money from a special academisation 
fund,  “belonging  to  an  association”  is  added  as  a  precondition.    This 
forces every institution into a sometimes difficult choice. 
Launching the association concept proved to be a real catalyst.  Most 
universities  have  not  waited  for  the  approval  of  the  new  law  before 
engaging  in  that  direction.    Success  is  due  to  unexpected  competitive 
reasons but also because it  appeared as a powerful new instrument to 
solve some old problems hitherto stuck in “good intentions only”. 
The association has a first important task to steer the academisation 
process for the two cycle programmes.  This ought to be done by actively 
involving assistants and teachers from the polytechnics in the university 
research  and  by  inbedding  the  concerned  curricula  in  their  relevant  
research domains at the mother institution.  By concentrating all research 
responsibility  at  the  university,  the  legislator  hopes  to  avoid 
fragmentation and inefficient uses of scarce research monies. 
The  whole  development  appears  to  be  a  breakthrough  in  a  long-
standing ambition of the polytechnics.  However many are afraid that it 
might  be  a  poisoned  present.    Even  stressing  the  applied  character  of 
polytechnic research, for most institutions and most teachers it will be a 
formidable task.  Looking at publication records, little has been realised 
up to now.  It will take years to change vested behavioural patterns and 
attitudes.    Besides,  they  still  have  to  keep  open  to  their  comparative 
advantage in vocational contacts and entrepreneurial consulting. 
Of  course,  many  see  the  “association”  as  a  forerunner  for  further 
reaching mergers between many institutions.  This might very well be the 
philosophy  behind  the  largest  association  around  K.U.Leuven.  
K.U.Leuven  distrusted  the  regional  dimension  of  the  politically 
conceived construction.  Leuven has indeed very few polytechnics in its 
region and hence might lose a considerable part of its students’ influx 
especially in its advanced studies and doctoral programmes.  Therefore, 
in  a  bold  and  fast  move,  it  decided  to  anticipate  the  new  law  and 
established  a  nationwide  association.    It  now  encompasses  11 
polytechnics  in  one  single  network.    Together  the  new  association 
represents 42 pct of all Flemish students in higher education.  In that way 
the  Leuven-association  will  carry  a  heavy  weight  and  a  considerable 
influence  in  the  political  decision  making  too.    The  originality  and, 
maybe,  the  effectiveness  of  the  construction  is  that  each  partner  has 
accepted to replace its own “general assembly” by a new one which for 
66 pct has the same composition for all partners.  On association level, 
strong decisions will be possible and, leaving the association on eventual 
disagreement, will practically be impossible. 
Although not in the same intensive way, the Universities of Antwerp, 
Genth, Limburg and Brussels have done the same but stick to the regional 
approach. 
Next to the academisation objective,  for the association there is  a 
secondary agenda.  Looking at the new law submitted to parliament, it 
strikes the attention that, by combining issues, the government wants to 
realise a series of other difficult objectives. 
In the first place, there is the issue of size and the economics of scale 
which  comes  with it.   In the nineties,  a  major  merger  movement had 
already reduced the number of polytechnics from 160 to 21 in Flanders.  
Average size however, is still not more than 4700 students, each with a 
too  broad  and  overlapping  programme  supply.    This  begs  for  further 
rationalisation.  This tedious issue, very often with annoying personnel 
consequences, is now pushed into the lap of the associations.  They are 
requested to “optimise” the programme structure among their partners.  
As  can  be  read  in  the  law,  other  tasks  are:  the  harmonisation  of  the 
curriculum  profiles,  creating  the  conditions  for  flexible  learning  
trajectories  and  especially  making  bridges  from  bachelors  to  masters.  
Important  also  are  the  joint  multi-year  programmes  for  teaching 
innovation.  Finally should be mentioned the responsibility over the way 
the academisation subsidy has to be spent. 
For the academic profession, undoubtedly much will change.  The 
protection of a stable and familiar environment and the collegial attitude 
of  “live  and  let  live”,  with  room  for  personal  considerations,  will  be 
jeopardised.  Economics of scale will lead to a much more professional 
approach  for quality  management.   Weeding out underperforming and 
less attractive programmes will be easier and, flexible career tracks for 
professors a normal outcome.  Collaboration in centres of excellence as 
aimed for in K.U.Leuven-association will be challenging.  Most of all, 
however, the association means more performance pressures and higher 
standards. 
For one-cycle schools, it possibly might be a tough task to maintain 
the vocational character in an environment where the dominant university 
is strongly research biased.  Indeed, for this last one, to move from a 
selective research status to become the champion of mass education as 
well, is not evident.  
 
E.  The importance of an appropriate model of strategic decision-making 
 
In fifth place, the IMEC-story suggests the crucial importance of choosing 
from the existing  models of strategic  management, the one  which is  most 
appropriate for a given university in a given environment.  To clarify this 
point, it is  worthwhile to dwell  for  a  while on the basic outlines of three 
schools of thought. 
 
 
IV.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 
 
A.  The traditional framework for strategic management 
   
To a large extent, the popularity of strategic management is due to its simple 
common sense and to its straightforward approach for decision-making.  In 
fact, it all starts from three basic questions, namely: do you know where you 
are?  Do  you know  where  you go?  Do  you know how  to get there?  In 
answering  these  questions,  traditionally  a  sequence  of  essential  steps  is 
advocated.    First  comes  a  systematic  scanning  of  the  environment.    An 
internal audit should reveal Strengths and Weaknesses in the organisation and 
an external audit focuses on the identification of Opportunities and Threats 
(SWOT-analysis).    Based  on  this  thorough  understanding  of  its  socio-
economic,  technological  and  political  environment,  an  attainable  and 
realistically reachable mission statement is written out.  This mission should 
explain  what  the  organisation  does,  what  it  tends  to  accomplish  and  what 
values ought to steer its behaviour.  Especially when it is clarified in separate 
policy statements for each field of activity, a mission which is widely shared 
throughout  the  whole  institution,  is  a  powerful  tool  for  coherent  decision 
making.  It is also the precondition for decentralisation and makes top-down 
command  less  necessary.    A  mission  becomes  operational  through  the 
formulation of concrete objectives which leads to a mission driven budget 
allocation  and  desired  organisational  adjustments.    Finally,  continuous 
evaluation of performances and feedback to decision-makers is a last crucial 
component. 
  In the course of the years, this basic framework for strategic decision 
making has been enriched and diversified into different schools of thought.  
This has happened not in the least by taking into consideration the lessons of 
“organisation theory” about the sectoral differences in behaviour and desired 
structures.  For instance, the mass production industry might require another 
approach  than  the  Higher  Education  sector.    But  even  within  Higher 
Education, one university can prefer to use one specific model rather than 
another.  This will depend on its size, the complexity of its offerings , its 
traditions or the impact of  government regulations.  Important is that it is 
coherent and goal oriented.  
In what follows, a short explanation of three schools of thought will 
be given , each time together with a short outline of the strategy of a particular 
university  that  applies it:   the planning school is the basic pattern  for the 
London School of Economics (LSE); the learning school is very present in the 
approach of the Copenhagen Business School (CBS) and, in a more implicit 
way,  also  at  K.U.Leuven;  the  entrepreneurial  school  is  the  model  for  the 
University of Twente in Holland. 
 
 
B.  The planning school 
 
The planning school defends the necessity of a strong formalisation of the 
basic  framework  of  strategic  management.    Important  is  the  separation  of 
thinking from doing and the central role of a plan that subdivides the process 
into a sequence of steps.  Each step is neatly delineated and documented by 
hard data  and technical  analysis.   The  general strategy is broken down in 
substrategies, each with a series of targets to be attained and a budget to make 
it  possible.    Strict  control  mechanisms  are  used  to  control  whether  the 
planning instructions are carried out as specified in the plan. 
Undoubtedly,  in  such  an  approach  the  danger  exists  that  the  top 
governance  of  the  institution  loses  its  impact  in  favour  of  an  isolated 
bureaucracy of highly skilled  technicians who enforce upon the institution a 
rigid and inflexible “official plan”.  Very often, such a model also neglects the 
organisational climate and the cultural requirements necessary for an efficient 
implementation. 
In the beginning years of strategic management, the planning school 
has been very useful by its insistence on the necessity to found decisions on 
real data, hard analysis, a coherent framework and clear objectives. 
Despite its critics, the planning school is still applied today and it 
works.    The  prominent  example  is  the  London  School  of  Economics  and 
Social Science.  Looking at the strategic document of LSE (LSE (2000)), one 
is surprised by the concise formulation of its mission statement.  It is a kind of 
a mobilising battle cry in no more than 16 words. It sounds as follows: “To be 
a world class university centre of the social sciences in the heart of London”.  
It  is  clarified  what  it  means,  also  in  an  equally  brief  way:  international 
reputation requires academic diversity, a solid financial foundation and the 
creation of an excellent learning environment so as to attract the brightest staff 
and students; the London School of Economics explicitly aims at being the 
real guardian of social sciences worldwide: they consider it their mission to 
lead  the  scientific  debate  in  all  areas  of  social  sciences,  which  of  course, 
requires  that  LSE  covers  all  subjects  and  that  cross  subsidisation  is 
sufficiently high to keep also the less remunerative subdisciplines working on 
an  international  level;    “In  the  heart  of  London”  refers  to  the  regional 
responsibility, not in the least by creating chances for disadvantaged students 
of the London area.  
Most impressive in their strategic management is the extreme detail 
of their goal setting: at a certain moment, LSE went as far as to formulate 29 
strategic  objectives  with  85  subobjectives  and  not  less  than  320  concrete 
targets.    In  a  yearly  process,  for  each  target  the  degree  of  attainment  is 
examinated  and  amended  for  the  future.    Moreover,  for  each  target  the 
required  resources  are  explicitly  specified.    The  whole  constitutes  is  an 
impressive  planning  document.    It  is  built  up  and  yearly  reviewed  in  the 
interplay of an academic planning and resource committee, a planning team, a 
finance committee and, finally, the university council.  
Preparing  for  the  strategic  planning  period  2004-2009,  some 
revisions  have  been  made,  apparently  without  changing  the  general 
organisational set up of the planning exercise.  The mission statement for that 
period  stresses  even  more  than  before:  globalisation,  interdisciplinary 
thinking, excellence of teaching through its reliance on cutting-edge research 
and a framework for identifying emerging trends and a speedy response to 
them (LSE (2004)). 
The  corporate  planning  statements  2004/2005  specify  senior 
managements priorities for these years.  It again reviews in a systematic and 
detailed way, the school’s performance against planned activities and targets 
(LSE (2003)). 
Regarding the immense success of LSE, this approach of strategic 
management apparently works well.  The question is whether it is equally 




C. The learning school 
 
That is apparently the implicit position taken by the Learning School.  For the 
adherents of this school, the world is too complex for central planning from an 
all  informed  headquarters.    They  also  remind  us  that,  according  to 
“organisation  theory”,  universities  are  to  be  classified  in  the  category  of  
“professional bureaucracies”, therefore decision making has to be devolved as 
much as possible from the central headquarter to the operational level of the 
professors in their departments.  Another most exciting starting point is the 
thesis  that  one  should  break  out  of  the  traditional  boundaries  of  one’s 
playfield as it is deducted from a traditional SWOT analysis.  It is important 
not  only  to  play  the  same  game  better  but  also,  to  look  for  a  different 
playground or, even better, to look for completely new games. 
  From these starting points,  a  model is developed that stresses the 
improvement  within  the  institution  of  the  so  called  four  competences  of 
learning  which are:  the  capacity to  absorb new  knowhow;  the  capacity to 
diffuse  knowledge throughout the institution; the  capacity to generate new 
knowledge  and  the  capacity  to  exploit  it.    Not  only  should  these  learning 
capacities be developed, but attention should also go to a systematic effort to  
reduce learning blockages such as: the refusal to learn from past experiences 
and from one’s own errors. 
Logically, such a school of thought prefers a more vague, but also a 
more ambitious “vision statement” above the previous concept of a realistic 
and attainable “mission”.  Stressing the need to decentralise, the university 
governance  is  advised  to  move  to  a  kind  of  leadership  that  inspires  and 
encourages.    It  should  be  its  duty  to  create  an  organisational  climate  that 
mobilizes all possible competences and innovative creativity  everywhere in 
the university. 
Top  management should explicitly  create favourable condition for 
risk taking and experimentation. Examples for such an approach are: special 
rectors funds, abolishment of the hierarchical chair system and, especially, 
competitive project funding. 
The  above  discussed  networking  strategy  fits  equally  well  in  this 
school of thought. 
  The  learning  school  corresponds  to  what  is  implicitly  done    at 
K.U.Leuven and is even explicitly mentioned by the Copenhagen Business 
School as a dominant pillar of its strategy.  In this respect it is worthwhile to 
have a look at the strategic document of CBS. 
  CBS is a middle-sized university, with one faculty for social sciences 
and  one  for  the  humanities.    An  interfaculty  department  constitutes  the 
platform  where  both  collaborate  on  intercultural  communication  and 
management.  CBS summarizes its mission as follows: “CBS wants to make a 
major contribution to value creation for Danish Business and Danish Society; 
it wants to train graduates for the international job market and its research-
based  knowledge  is  realised  in  an  intensive  partnership  with  other 
organisations”. 
Three  strategic  pillars  sustain  these  objectives,  namely: 
internationalisation, partnership with business and, above all, its concept of 
the learning university. 
The internationalisation implies that research and teaching at CBS 
are planned in an international context.  Its standards are international.  So are 
its benchmarking partners.  CBS strives to participate in as many international 
research  and  teaching  consortia  as  possible  and  English  is  used  as  the 
language for a large number of its graduate programs.   
Partnership  with  Danish  business  materialises  through  jointly 
conceived  training  programs  for  business  executives  and  by  setting  up 
“Business  Research  Centres”  in  different  areas  of  interest.    For  their 
interpretation  of  the  Learning  University,  reference  is  made  to  what  is 
explained above about the learning school of thought. 
 
 
D. The entrepreneurial university 
 
It is felt that the learning school with its extensive learning capacity and with 
its  enormous  mobilizing  power  is  the  right  approach  for  a  complex  
organisation in times of change and turbulence.  Critics however point to the 
danger  of  wasting  resources  because  of  learning  and  engaging  in  wrong 
directions.  That is exactly the correction that an influential author like Burton 
Clark suggests in his book about the “entrepreneurial universities” in Europe 
(Clark (1998)).  His thinking is close to what is explained above about the 
learning school.  He however adds the explicit need of a “stronger steering 
core”.    It  remains  however  important  that  this  steering  fully  respects  “the 
academic heartland”.  Equally interesting is his use of so called outreach 
offices to escape the rather rigid and slow bureaucracy which is so typical in 
West European Universities.  Outreach offices work under direct supervision 
of the rectorate and outside of the normal administrative procedures of the 
university.    At  K.U.Leuven,  a  good  illustration  is  the  industry-university 
interface Leuven Research and Development . 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In recent years most institutions of higher learning have embarked upon one 
or other form of strategic management.  Very often  results have remained 
below  expectations.    The  main  reason  for  it  most  probably  lies  with  the 
temptation to thoughtlessly copy the models used for industry.  It is too easily 
neglected  that  such  constructions  are  conceived  for  a  completely  different 
world.    More  than  what  is  true  for  business,  in  higher  education  strategic 
management  needs  to  be  worked  out  with  a  keen  eye  on  the  specific 
organisational  characteristics  of  that  sector.    To  find  out  what  is  really 
important for strategic decision making in universities, instead of relying on 
yet another prescriptive model of yet another management guru, it is much 
more rewarding to start out from comparative benchmaking and to look at 
concrete cases of decision making in some major universities.  Doing so, most 
striking  in  the  educational  world  of  today  is  the  astonishing  power  of 
networking and strategic alliances that result from it.  In a globalising world 
interuniversity competition for talent has become very real.  Attracting and 
retaining best staff and students requires an allocation system that rewards 
excellence, allows for decentralised decision-making and makes bottom up 
growth  of  centres  of  excellence  possible.    In  the  egalitarian  tradition  of 
academic freedom, this last is not evident.  For most universities it means a 
strengthening of the steering core.  But that counteracts not only university 
tradition but also the decentralised decision-making.  It is a delicate balance 
that can be reached not by top down command but by inspiring leadership of 
the flag waving type.  Such steering is driven by a broadly shared vision over 
years slowly imbedded in the corporate culture of the institution. 
On  the  condition  that  they  are  thoroughly  adapted  to  the  specific 
characteristics  of  higher  education,  some  of  the  traditional  models  for 
strategic management from industry might contribute to an orderly approach 
of  strategic  decision-making.    Among  them  the  so  called  learning  school 
stands out for dealing with the complexities of a modern university, which  
more and more appears as a set of overlapping networks kept together by a 





1.  Reworked from a text presented ar the International Conference on Strategic Management 
and Institutional Research in Higher Education, Moscow, 3-4 December 2002. 
2.  Cambridge, Edinburgh, Geneva, Heidelberg, Helsinki, Karolinska, Leiden, Leuven, Milano, 





Clark,  B.,  1998,  Creating  Entrepreneurial  Universities.    Organisational  Pathways  of 
Transformation (International Association of Universities Press, Pergamon). 
Copenhagen  Business  School,  1998,  Strategic  Update  ’95  (Copenhagen  Business  School, 
Copenhagen). 
Declercq, 2002, Een merkwaardige geschiedenis: het ontstaan van LRD, in  Debackere, K en De 
Bondt,  R,  Leuven  Research  en  Development,  30  jaar  doorbraak  en  innovatie  aan  een 
ondernemende universiteit, (Universitaire Pers Leuven, Leuven), 9-18. 
Geuna, A., 1998, Resource Allocation and Knowledge Productions, Studies in the Economics of 
University Research, (University of Maastricht). 
De Dijn, H., 2002, De invloed van het Management op het Hoger Onderwijs, Tijdschrift voor 
onderwijsrecht en onderwijsbeleid, november, 202-206 
IMEC, Seeds for Tomorrow’s World, Imecnology, Jaarverslag 2003 (IMEC, Leuven). 
K.U.Leuven, 2004, Jaarverslag 2003. 
LERU,  2005,  Growth,  Research-Incentive  Universities  and  the  European  Research  Council 
(LERU, Leuven). 
LSE, 2000, Strategic Plan, (London School of Economics, London). 
LSE, Corporate Planning Statement 2004/05, Strategic Priorities, (London School of Economics, 
London). 
Mintzberg, H., 1992, Organisatiestructuren, (Prentice Hall, Hempstead, UK) 
Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., Lampel, J., 1998, Strategic Safari. A guided Tour through the Wilds 
of Strategic Management. 
O’Leary, J., 1996, Top Universities Forced into New Ivy League, The Times, (News/Multimedia). 
Overlaet, B., Verdin, P., Subramanian, V., 1999, University Management: Strategic Similarities 
with Business (EAIR forum, San Sebastian), The Economist, Free degrees, 26th of March 
2005. 
Porter, M., 1980, Competitive Strategy, (Free Press, New York). 
Sporn, B., 1999, Adaptive University Structures.  An Analysis of Adaptation to Socioeconomic 
Environments of US and European Universities, (Jessica Kinsley Publisher, London). 
Tavernier,  K.,  1991,  Strategic  Evaluation  in  University  Management,  Higher  Education 
Management 3, 3, 257-268. 
Tavernier, K., 2004, The Academic Profession in a Belgian Context, 2004, in Enders, J., and De 
Weert,  E.,  ed.,  The  International  Attractiveness  of  the  Academic  Workplace  in  Europe, 
Gewerkschaft, Erziehung und Wissenschaft, 52-71. 
Vlaamse  Gemeenschap,  2003,  Decreet  over  de  herstructurering  van  het  hoger  onderwijs, 
(Brussel). 
 